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This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset 
of countries, which we term a nonpreferential trading club. We show that there exist 
coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between these 
countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these member countries while leaving 
the welfare of non-members unaltered. These tariff reforms are chosen to maintain world 
prices at their pre-club levels and, in this respect, the trading clubs act in a Kemp-Wan-like 
manner. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, 
MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare. Open 
regionalism is an example of such trading arrangements. 
JEL classification: F15. 
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1. Introduction
In his seminal book on “The Theory of Customs Unions”, Meade (1955) addressed
the following question: when is a customs union involving only small tariﬀ changes
beneﬁcial? This question has been central to the literature on the economics of
preferential trading arrangements, a survey of which has recently, and elegantly, been
presented by Panagariya (2000) in the Journal of Economic Literature.1
1Bhagwati, Krishna and Panagariya (1999) provide a compendium of the major papers that have
fashioned this literature.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 4
The present paper asks a somewhat diﬀerent question, viz.: when is a trading club
involving only small tariﬀ changes beneﬁcial? With the diﬀerence between the two
questions being only on customs unions vs. trading clubs, it is important to clarify
this diﬀerence. According to our deﬁnition, a (non-preferential) trading club is a
group of countries that agree to coordinate their non-discriminatory tariﬀ policies and
to undertake internal income transfers. By contrast, a preferential trading club, as
deﬁned by Kemp (1969), provides preferential tariﬀ rates to club members and hence
is essentially discriminatory in its tariﬀ policies. Special cases of a preferential trading
club are free trade areas and customs unions, both of which completely eliminate taxes
on internal trade. The focus of this paper is on the welfare implications of tariﬀ reform
by a (non-preferential) trading club, that is, by a subset of countries that employ non-
discriminatory tariﬀ policies consistent with the World Trade Organisation’s “most
favoured nation” principle.
While academic research has focused on well-deﬁned preferential trading arrange-
ments (such as customs unions and free trade areas) on the one hand and on mul-
tilateral tariﬀ reforms on the other, interest in the study of non-preferential trading
arrangements by a subset of countries is sparked by the recent policy debate con-
cerning “open regionalism”. The present paper is the ﬁrst to provide a theoretical
justiﬁcation for the advantages of open regionalism.
Open regionalism, embraced by the Asian PaciﬁcE c o n o m i cC o o p e r a t i o n( A P E C )
at its inception in 1989, was deﬁned by its stronger advocates as trade liberaliza-
tion by a group of countries based on an unconditional most-favoured-nation (MFN)Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 5
principle.2 In his discussion of open regionalism, Bergsten (1997) argues that an un-
conditional MFN trade liberalization will create beneﬁts for non-members, who will
then have a reduced incentive to reciprocally liberalize their trade.3 B a s e do nt h i s
free-riding problem of non-discriminatory tariﬀ reductions, it is argued that open
regionalism needs to be redeﬁned before it can be proven operational.4 What the
present paper shows is that open regionalism (non-preferential trading clubs in our
terminology) can be designed in a way that does not induce any free-riding by non-
members.
By combining tools from multilateral tariﬀ reform theory5 and features of the
Kemp-Wan mechanism6 for the creation of welfare improving customs unions, we
show that non-preferential trading clubs can be designed so that the countries that
are members of the club are better oﬀ and the countries outside the club are not
worse oﬀ.7 Within a many country, many commodity general equilibrium model of
trade we prove a result that characterizes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
a strict Pareto improvement in club welfare. This constitutes the ﬁrst main formal
contribution of this paper. Careful interpretation of this result (lemma) leads to a
number of propositions that spell out the implications of our non-preferential trading
clubs. These propositions show that, under weak conditions, a trading club can obtain
2See, for example, Elek (1992).
3See also Panagaryia (1999) for a similar view.
4In particular, Bergsten (1997) argues in favour of a conditional MFN principle, whereby APEC
countries liberalize their trade with countries that also do the same.
5See, for example, Hatta and Fukushima (1979), Fukushima and Kim (1989), Diewert, Turunen-
Red and Woodland (1989), Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991, 2001), Anderson and Neary (1992)
and Neary (1998).
6See, for example, Kemp and Wan (1976) and Ohyama (1972).
7Neary (1998) combines also the tariﬀ reform literature and the Kemp-Wan proposition. However,
his emphasis is upon the replication of the Kemp-Wan proposition and not, as in this paper, on non-
preferential trading clubs.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 6
a strict Pareto improvement in club welfare, while maintaining the welfare levels of
all other countries at their pre-club levels. A sequence of such welfare improvements
exists when ever the prices in the member countries are not all equal. In particular,
our results show that the limit of such a sequence of trading-club equilibria is an
equilibrium that is conditionally Pareto optimal for the club members. Moreover,
this conditionally Pareto optimal trading club equilibrium is shown to be welfare
e q u i v a l e n tt ot h eK e m p - W a nc u s t o m su n i o n-o u rs e c o n dm a i nf o r m a lc o n t r i b u t i o n .
Overall, the paper argues that there exist regional, MFN-consistent, arrangements
that lead to Pareto improvements to world welfare.8
The essential idea of using tariﬀ policy to keep world prices ﬁxed was originally
used in the context of customs unions. It was ﬁrst mentioned by Kemp (1964) and
Vanek (1965) and later rigorously employed by Ohyama (1972) and Kemp and Wan
(1976, 1986). More recently, McMillan (1993) and Srinivasan (1997) have proposed
the rewriting of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariﬀsa n dT r a d eo n
the basis of the Kemp-Wan mechanism for customs union formation. While the
Kemp-Wan mechanism involves the setting of the union’s common external tariﬀst o
ensure that world prices are unchanged, it also requires the vector of external trade
between the union members and the rest of the world to remain unchanged. The
latter property of the mechanism follows from the ﬁrst if the countries outside the
customs union remain passive following its formation.
Aspects of the Kemp-Wan mechanism have appeared in some studies outside the
8MFN refers to the “most favoured nation” principle of the WTO, whereby tariﬀ reductions oﬀered
to a subset of countries is automatically extended to all other countries. By MFN-consistent we mean
that each country sets non-discriminatory tariﬀs that apply to trade with every other country.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 7
customs union context. First, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) have elegantly employed the
“keeping-world-prices-ﬁxed” idea in explaining the economics of GATT negotiations.
They showed that negotiated tariﬀ changes made under the principles of reciprocity
and non-discrimination, the two pillars of the GATT, lead necessarily to ﬁxed world
prices, thus eliminating the incentive for aggressive use of optimal tariﬀst og e n e r -
ate favourable terms-of-trade eﬀects. Unlike the Kemp-Wan mechanism, however,
there is no restriction on the length of any (individual country or aggregate) trade
vector, since all countries are assumed to participate in the negotiations. Second,
Ohyama (2002) and Panagariya and Krishna (2002) use the Kemp-Wan mechanism
in designing free trade areas that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare, thus
extending the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama result for customs unions to free trade areas.
In the present paper, we make use of both aspects of the Kemp-Wan mechanism
but our application is in yet a diﬀerent area - that of trading clubs. We use the
Kemp-Wan mechanism in our model of trading clubs to show that open regionalism
can be made to work for the beneﬁto ft h ew o r l dc o m m u n i t y .
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the frame-
work that we use and derives the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for obtaining
a strict Pareto improvement in trading club welfare. The Kemp-Wan-like construc-
tion, whereby world prices are kept ﬁxed, ensures that a Pareto improvement in
world welfare is achieved. Section 3 presents a number of propositions on piece-
meal tariﬀ reform by a trading club and also provides a diagrammatic exposition of
these propositions. We demonstrate that the limiting case of a sequence of strict
Pareto improving reforms by the club is conditionally Pareto optimal for the club.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 8
In section 4, we compare our conditionally optimal trading club with the Kemp-Wan
customs union and establish the welfare equivalence of these two (conceptually dif-
ferent) regional arrangements.9 Section 5 provides concluding remarks and links our
theoretical results to several policy issues, including the philosophical bases for tariﬀ
reforms espoused by APEC and its open regionalism concept and the issue of the
adherence of regional trading agreements to the WTO rules.
2. Pareto Welfare Gains in Trading Clubs
The focus of this paper is on the welfare implications of tariﬀ reform by a trad-
ing club, which is deﬁned as a subset of countries that agree to coordinate their
non-discriminatory tariﬀ policies and to undertake internal income transfers. The
following sub-section provides a speciﬁcation of the model and the subsequent one
provides a characterization of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of strict Pareto improvements in the trading club.
2.1. The Model of World Trade. We consider a perfectly competitive general
equilibrium model of the world, consisting of  nations trading in  internationally
tradeable commodities. Following Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991), the model






( )=∈  (2)
X
∈
 =0  (3)
9While our optimal trading club is a non-preferential trading club, the Kemp-Wan customs union
is a preferential one.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 9
in terms of the world price vector  (| denotes the transpose of a vector), the do-
mestic price vectors  for each country  ∈ , the utility levels  f o re a c hc o u n t r y
 ∈  and the transfers abroad  f o re a c hc o u n t r y ∈ . 10 In this speciﬁcation,
( ) ≡ 	()−
( ) is the net revenue function, being the diﬀerence be-
tween the gross domestic product function 	 and the consumer expenditure function

 Also, 
() ≡∇ () denotes the gradient of the net revenue function
with respect to prices and represents the vector of compensated net export functions
for nation .T h e s p e c i ﬁcation of the technologies and preferences is very general.
The national production possibilities sets satisfy minimal conditions such as convex-
ity and allow for joint production and intermediate inputs, while the preferences also
satisfy minimal conditions.11 However, in this and the subsequent section, diﬀer-
entiability is assumed to permit the diﬀerential tariﬀ reform analysis. Conditions
suﬃcient for the existence of equilibrium for this tariﬀ-distorted world economy are
implicitly assumed.12
Equations (1)-(3) consist of the market equilibrium conditions, the budget con-
straints for each country and the world budget constraint. The market equilibrium
conditions express the requirement that the net exports of countries,  ≡ 
( ),
sum to the zero vector, meaning that world markets clear. The budget constraints
state that the value (at world prices) of net exports (the balance of trade) must be
matched by a transfer of income abroad, . In our atemporal world, the national
10The notation  is used to denote the set of countries as well as the number of countries.
11See, Diewert (1972) for a speciﬁcation of the conditions on technologies and preferences under-
lying the revenue and expediture functions. Woodland (1982) also spells out these speciﬁcations and
the properties of the revenue and expenditure functions.
12See, for example, Sontheimer (1971) for such conditions and a proof of existence of equilibrium
in a tariﬀ-distorted model of world trade.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 10
budget constraints are simply the requirements of zero current account balances.
The world budget constraint require these transfers abroad to sum to zero over all
countries.
It is implicit in this formulation of the model that there is just one consumer
in each country, who receives a transfer from the government and has utility .13
The model is expressed in terms of domestic and world prices. These are connected
by tariﬀs, which may be expressed in speciﬁc terms, whence we may write  =
() ≡  + 14
In this paper, countries will be divided into two groups - those that wish to
form a trading club and those that do not. The set of countries that form the
trading club is denoted by ,w h i l e is the set of non-club countries. Let
 =(  ),  =(  ),a n d =(  ) be obvious partitions of the vectors
 and  into elements for club members () and non-member countries (). The
initial equilibrium, before the club is formed, is arbitrarily given and characterized
by ()=( 0 0) and ()=( 00). At this initial equilibrium, the vector of







0). The initial equilibrium might, of course, be
a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative tariﬀ game but this interpretation is not
essential. The post-club equilibrium involves the club members setting their own
13It is relatively straightforward to extend the model, at the cost of added notational complexity,
to handle multi-household economies. In the case of multiple households, Pareto improvement may
be ensured by assuming the existence of lump sum income transfers between households and the
national governments. Alternatively, under appropriate assumptions, commodity taxes may be used
to carry out internal Pareto-improving redistributions. See, for example, Diewert, Turunen-Red and
Woodland (1989, 1991) and Dixit and Norman (1980).
14T h em o d e lm a ya l s ob es p e c i ﬁed in terms of ad valorem tariﬀ rates rather than speciﬁc( u n i t )
tariﬀ rates.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 11
non-discriminatory tariﬀs and a system of intra-club income transfers.
2.2. Preliminary Lemma on Pareto Gains. The purpose of this sub-section is
to characterize the conditions that are necessary and suﬃcient for obtaining a Pareto
improvement in world welfare. Attention is restricted to policy initiatives by a subset
of countries that we refer to as a trading club. According to our deﬁnition, a trading
club is a group of countries that choose to undertake coordinated non-discriminatory
tariﬀ reforms and intra-club transfers of income.
Attention is further restricted to a trading club that is assumed to behave in a
Kemp-Wan-like manner in the sense that it coordinates its policy reforms to ensure
that the world prices of traded goods are unaltered. As a consequence of this restric-
tion on its choice of policy, the volume of trade with the rest of the world will also be
unaltered provided that the countries in the rest of the world do not alter their tariﬀ
policies as a result of the club’s activities. This passive policy behavior on the part
of the rest of the world will be assumed.15 The task is to characterize the conditions
whereby all members of the club gain in welfare. Given that the rest of the world’s
trading environment is unchanged, those countries will be unaﬀected by the club’s
policies. The outcome will be a strict Pareto improvement for the club, no change
in welfare for the rest of the world and, hence, a semi-strict Pareto improvement in
welfare for the world.
15As Richardson (1995) demonstrates via an example, the Kemp-Wan proposition may break
down if the rest of the world alters its tariﬀs strategically. To counter this observation Kemp and
Shimomura (2001) have provided a second “elementary proposition on customs unions” whereby
the union chooses, not a common external tariﬀ vector, but a common external tariﬀ function that
leaves the union’s oﬀer surface unchanged and thus ensures a strict Pareto improvement for the union
irrespective of the response by the rest of the world. Both Richardson’s critique and the Kemp and
Shimomura response apply also to our analysis of trading clubs.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 12
Speciﬁcally, the club is to choose domestic price vectors , a vector of transfers
 and a vector of utilities  that generate the same external trade vector as before,
satisfy the aggregate balance of trade restriction at the same world prices as before
and provide greater utility for all union members. Since the club’s balance of trade
restriction automatically holds (
|
0
0 =0 ) due to the price homogeneity properties
of the foreign net export functions and since transfers are available, only the internal
market equilibrium conditions are constraining for the club.
Given the requirement that the aggregate trade vector with the rest of the world
is set at its the pre-club value, 







We now consider whether it is possible to alter the domestic prices and utilities so
that this system of equations remains satisﬁed and every member country experiences
a strict gain in utility. If so, a strict Pareto improvement has been established. It will
be shown, under certain assumptions, that a strict Pareto improvement in welfare
for club members is possible if and only if there are price diﬀerentials among club
members.













() is the substitution matrix for country ,
measuring the response of compensated net outputs to changes in prices, and 
 ≡Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 13
∇()=∇
() is a vector of ‘income’ eﬀects for country ,m e a s u r i n g
the response of compensated net outputs to changes in utility. We consider whether
a solution to this system exists with   0 ∈  To obtain our main result,
the following assumption on technologies and preferences is made.
Assumption A: (i)The club member countries’ substitution matrices 
 have
maximal rank  − 1. (ii) The club members’ expenditure functions are strictly in-
creasing in utility, that is, 
 ≡∇ ()  0
Using this assumption, we obtain the following result that identiﬁes the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the attainment of a strict Pareto improvement in welfare
for the club members.
Lemma: Let Assumption A hold at the initial pre-club equilibrium. A strict
Pareto improvement in club welfare exists if, and only if, domestic price vectors are
not all the same (up to a factor of proportionality), i.e.  6=  for some  and .
Proof. We are concerned with whether a solution to the linear system (5) exists
with   0 ∈  By Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, as expressed in
Diewert, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1989, p. 212), a solution exists if and only if
there does not exist a solution  to the dual system
|[
 ( ∈ )]  0 |[
 ( ∈ )] = 0 (6)
where the inequality 0 means that vector  is semi-negative (all elements are
non-positive and at least one element is negative).
(i) Let  6=  for some  and . Since Assumption A holds, the equation systemNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 14
|
 =0only has the nontrivial solution  ( 6=0 )and the equation system
|

 =0only has the nontrivial solution  ( 6=0 )  For both equation systems
to hold, as in the second part of (6), we need  =  whence  =( ),
which contradicts the assumption that  6= . Thus, (6) has no solution for  and
so, by Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, a strict Pareto improvement in union
welfare exists.
(ii) Let all domestic prices be equal up to a factor of proportionality, that is
 = 0 where 0 is the common price vector. Thus,  = 0 solves the equations
|
 =0for all  ∈ .A l s o ,|
 = 0|
 =( 1 )|
 =( 1 )
  0
for all  ∈  since 
  0 due to the assumption that the consumer expenditure
functions are increasing in utility (part (ii) of Assumption A). Thus, there is a solution
 to (6) and hence, by Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, there does not exist a
strict Pareto improvement in union welfare.
Before discussing this Lemma, some remarks on the nature of Assumption A and
on the possibilities for its relaxation are in order.
Remark 1. Part (i) of Assumption A implies that each member country has curva-
ture to its net export function. It rules out, for example, the possibility of having
both Leontief preferences and a pointed production possibilities frontier at the initial
equilibrium, which together imply that net exports are not responsive to diﬀerential
changes in prices. Moreover, while part (i) applies to every country, this requirement
can be relaxed at the expense of a more cumbersome wording of the Lemma. All that
is needed for the Lemma to hold is that there exists ap a i ro fc o u n t r i e s(rather than
all countries in the club) for which the domestic prices are diﬀerent and for whichNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 15
the substitution matrices have maximal rank at the initial equilibrium.16
Remark 2. Part (ii) of Assumption A is very weak. It merely states that the con-
sumer needs to spend more on goods to achieve a higher level of utility. This as-
sumption is consistent with the inferiority of goods in consumption; indeed, only one
good needs to be normal in consumption at each level of utility, possibly a diﬀerent
good at diﬀerent levels of utility. It is, therefore, the minimal normality assumption
that can be made.
This Lemma leads to several interesting propositions concerning welfare reform,
to which attention is now turned.
3. Tariff Reform in Trading Clubs
The above Lemma establishes conditions under which a strict Pareto improvement in
welfare may be achieved by a subset (trading club) of countries that choose changes
in tariﬀs and internal transfers to ensure that the world price vector, and hence the
vector of trade with the rest of the world, is unchanged. Provided that the rest of
the world acts passively (does not alter tariﬀs) to the policy initiatives by the club,
each nation in the rest of the world has unchanged utility since the world prices are
unchanged. Accordingly, there is a semi-strict Pareto improvement for the world as
a whole; club members gain, while all other countries neither gain nor lose. The
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a welfare gain are simply that the domestic
price vectors of the club members are not all equal in the initial equilibrium.
16This part of Assumption A can be further relaxed by simply assuming that there is a pair of





]=0has no solution  6=0 .T h i sa l l o w se a c h
national price substitution matrix to have less than maximal rank, implying linear dependence, but
ensures that there are directions of price changes that change or ‘control’ net exports, thus providing
the basis for eﬀective tariﬀ reform.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 16
To properly interpret the Lemma, it is important to be clear about the context and
implications. The ﬁrst point to note is that the trading club arranges its policy reform
in such a manner that the world prices of all traded goods, and hence the vector of
aggregate trade of the club members with the rest of the world, are unchanged. In this
sense, the trading club adopts a Kemp-Wan approach to its policy choice. However,
the second point to note is that the Lemma refers to non-discriminatory tariﬀ reform
by the members of the trading club. The club members each have arbitrarily given
initial tariﬀs and choose to alter national tariﬀs in a non-discriminatory way. The
resulting national domestic price vectors are, in general, diﬀerent and there are no
tariﬀ preferences given to club members. Accordingly, the club is neither a free trade
area nor a customs union. Third, an essential part of the co-ordination of tariﬀ
reforms by club members is a set of accompanying lump sum income transfers. It
is these transfers that allow the club members to enjoy a strict Pareto improvement
in welfare as a result of the tariﬀ changes; every club member gains. Collectively,
the club creates a more eﬃcient allocation of resources within the club through its
reform of tariﬀs and the transfers permit these eﬃciency gains to be distributed so
that every country gains in welfare. Finally, because the countries in the rest of the
world face the same world prices as before and, by assumption, choose to retain the
same tariﬀ policies as before, each country in the rest of the world has unchanged
welfare.
Thus, we have the following proposition that follows from the Lemma.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption A hold. Any subset of countries may form a trading
club that undertakes a diﬀerential, non-discriminatory reform of tariﬀs and internalNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 17
income transfers in such a way that there results a semi-strict Pareto improvement in
world welfare (with a strict Pareto improvement for the club and unchanged welfare
for each other country), provided the rest of the world adopts a passive policy response
(the rest of the world’s tariﬀs remain unchanged) and provided not every member
of the trading club has the same (up to a factor of proportionality) domestic price
vector. World prices and the vector of aggregate trade between the club and the rest
of the world remain unchanged.
While this proposition bears a strong resemblance to Kemp and Wan’s (1976)
proposition on the formation of customs unions, the two propositions are quite dif-
ferent.17 First, a Kemp-Wan customs union has internal free trade and hence tariﬀ
policies are inherently discriminatory; here the club employs non-discriminatory poli-
cies. Second, the Kemp-Wan proposition relates to a comparison of two discretely
diﬀerent equilibria; here the reforms are diﬀerential. Third, while the Kemp-Wan
proposition on customs unions establishes a weak Pareto improvement in welfare for
the union members, our proposition established a strict Pareto improvement in which
all members of the trading club experience an increase in welfare.
We now proceed to obtain further implications of the Lemma.
The Lemma establishes necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a strict Pareto im-
provement in welfare for the trading club. This means that there exists a suﬃciently
17The Kemp-Wan proposition is that any subset of countries can form a customs union agreement
comprising internal free trade, a common external tariﬀ and a set of internal income transfers to
provide a weak Pareto improvement in welfare for all the countries of the world. If the initial equilib-
rium has suﬃcient distortions, the countries in the union will obtain strict welfare improvements. In
either case, the Kemp-Wan customs union leaves the non-member countries as well oﬀ as before the
formation of the union, an outcome ensured by setting the common external tariﬀ such that world
prices and the vector of trade between the union and the rest of the world are unchanged. See, also,
Kemp and Wan (1986) for formal details on the assumptions underlying the proposition.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 18
small discrete change in member countries’ tariﬀs and transfers that generates a small
discrete increase in the utility levels of member countries.18 This means further that,
when ever domestic price vectors are not all the same, there is a sequence of small
discrete policy changes leading to small discrete strict Pareto improving changes in
club welfare. Thus, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption A hold. When ever the domestic price vectors of
the trading club members are not all equal (up to a factor of proportionality), there
exists a sequence of suﬃciently small discrete changes in the tariﬀsa n di n t e r n a l
transfers of club members that yields small discrete strict Pareto improvements in
club welfare provided the rest of the world adopts a passive policy response. At each
stage in the sequence, world prices and the aggregate vector of trade between the
club and the rest of the world remain unchanged.
Figure 1 illustrates such a sequence for the case of two goods and two club mem-
bers. The axes measure the amounts of the two goods. The point  is the club’s
aggregate production vector (assumed ﬁxed for simplicity) while point  is its aggre-
gate consumption vector before and after the formation of the club. The diﬀerence is
the net import vector for the club, again both before and after the formation of the
club. Thus, the ﬁgure reﬂects our adopted Kemp-Wan approach whereby the club
ensures that the world price vector and, hence, the aggregate club trade vector with
18If only a weak Pareto improvement were required, a zero derivative of a country’s utility level with
respect to the policy parameters can be consistent with increasing, decreasing or constant response





































Figure 1: SPI Transition of Club to Conditional Pareto OptimalityNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 19
the rest of the world are the same before and after the formation of the club.
The rectangular box formed by the origin and aggregate production point  shows
the allocation of production between the club members. Thus, point  denotes
the production points for the members (with origin for the production box at  for
member 2).
The rectangular box formed by the origin and the point  is the Edgeworth-
Bowley box for the analysis of intra-club exchange between the two club members.
Thus 1 denotes the origin for member 1 while  (labelled 2) becomes the origin
for member 2.P o i n t is the initial consumption point (showing vector 1
0 from origin
1 and vector 2
0 from origin 2) Clearly, this point is Pareto sub-optimal since the
slopes of the indiﬀerence curves through this point (hence initial domestic prices)
are diﬀerent. Consumption points that are Pareto superior to  occur in the cigar
shaped area labelled  Pareto optimal points that are weakly preferred to 
occur on the curve labelled 
Beginning at the initial consumption point , the arrowed path indicates the se-
quence of small discrete changes to consumption for the two single-household mem-
bers of the trading club. The initial Pareto-improving tariﬀ reform takes the club
from point  to point .19 The next reform moves the club from point  in a
19I ti si n t e r e s t i n gt oc o m p a r et h em o v e m e n tt op o i n t by a trading club with a movement to point
 by a free trade area. Panagariya and Krishna (2002) show that a free trade area using the Kemp-
Wan mechanism for ﬁxed world prices, internal transfers and rules of origin is welfare improving. If
such a free trade area moved to point  then equilibrium would be characterized by members having
diﬀerent prices due to diﬀerent external tariﬀs, internal free trade and rules of origin. By contrast,Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 20
Pareto-improving direction indicated by the arrow. At each stage in the sequence,
the utility level for each member country increases. As shown in Figure 1, this se-
quence is arranged to converge to point , which lies on the Pareto optimal curve
labelled . At this point no further Pareto improvements for the club are possible,
leading us to the next proposition.
If the price vectors in each of the club member countries are equal (up to a
factor of proportionality) then Proposition 2 does not apply and so further strict
Pareto improvements in welfare are not possible. This equilibrium with all domestic
price vectors equal is now shown to be Conditionally Pareto Optimal for the trading
club in the sense that the equilibrium is Pareto optimal for the members of the club,
given that the trading club employs a Kemp-Wan-like policy whereby world prices for
traded goods are kept at their initial pre-club values. Accordingly, given the Kemp-
Wan-like policy, the resulting equilibrium is Pareto optimal in that no member can be
made better oﬀ without making some other member worse oﬀ.20 In short, the term
conditional Pareto optimality for the club means that Pareto optimality is restricted
to club members and to a situation where the Kemp-Wan construction of ﬁxed world
prices occurs.
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption A hold. If all members of the trading club have the
same (up to a factor of proportionality) domestic price vectors then the equilibrium
is conditionally Pareto optimal for the club and every member imposes a common,
a trading club equilibrium at  requires neither discriminatory tariﬀsn o rr u l e so fo r i g i n .
20It should be noted that the non-existence of a strict Pareto improvement from an equilibrium is
logically diﬀerent from the Pareto optimality of that equilibrium. Hence, the following proposition
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non-discriminatory tariﬀ vector.
Proof. We are concerned with whether a solution to the linear system (5) exists
with   0 (a weak Pareto improvement) By Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative,
as expressed in Mangasarian (1969, p. 34), a solution exists if and only if there does
not exist a solution  to the dual system
|[
 ( ∈ )] ¿ 0 |[
 ( ∈ )] = 0 (7)
where the inequality  ¿ 0 means that vector  is strictly negative (all elements are
negative).
By assumption, all domestic prices are equal up to a factor of proportionality, that
is  = 0 where 0 is the common price vector. Thus,  = 0 solves the equations
|
 =0for all  ∈ .A l s o ,|
 = 0|
 =( 1 )|
 =( 1 )
  0
for all  ∈  since 
  0 due to the assumption that the consumer expenditure
functions are increasing in utility (part (ii) of Assumption A). Thus, there is a solution
 to (7) and hence, by Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative, there does not exist a
strict Pareto improvement in union welfare.
It is important to recognize that this proposition does not imply that the club
members have internal free trade. Hence, the club is not a customs union. Each
member country employs a non-discriminatory tariﬀ vector against trade with every
other country - club members and countries in the rest of the world are treated exactly
the same as far as tariﬀ policy is concerned. Moreover, a particular implication of
the common domestic prices ( =  for all  ∈ ) is that each country mustNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 22
have a common tariﬀ vector  =  − 21 This means that the member countries
have ‘harmonized’ their tariﬀ vectors.22
On the other hand, the club members do have a system of internal income transfers
that ensure that each member country beneﬁts from the eﬃciency gains arising from
the harmonization of tariﬀs. And, similarly to the Kemp-Wan construction of a
customs union, the policy parameters have been carefully chosen to ensure that world
prices are unchanged and, hence, that the volume of trade with, and utility levels
in, the rest of the world are unchanged. Thus, this Kemp-Wan-like trading club
that eliminates all domestic price diﬀerences is conditionally Pareto optimal for the
club and the equilibrium provides a strict Pareto improvement in welfare for the club
compared to the initial situation and a semi-strict Pareto improvement in welfare for
the world.
In summary, it is worth emphasizing that nowhere in the above proof of the
L e m m ao ri nt h es t a t e m e n to fP r o p o s i t i o n s1 - 3w a si td e m a n d e dt h a tt h ec l u b ’ s
internal trade should face zero tariﬀs. We demanded something more general, viz.
that the domestic (club’s internal) prices were equal. Thus, this generalized Kemp-
Wan construction for trading clubs allows for non-discriminatory tariﬀs and does not
require the club members to form a customs union with zero tariﬀso ni n t e r n a lc l u b
trade.
21The possibility that a Pareto optimal equilibrium could be supported by tariﬀsw a sn o t e db y
Mayer (1981, p. 142).
22However, note that this needs to be interpreted carefully since the member countries may, and
generally will, have diﬀerent trade patterns. Thus, for example, one member’s import duty on tennis
balls equals another member’s export subsidy on tennis balls.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 23
4. Optimal Trading Clubs and Customs Unions
The previous section dealt with diﬀerential tariﬀ reform in the trading club. In
the present section of the paper, we change direction and focus attention upon the
properties of the equilibrium for a conditionally Pareto optimal trading club. In
particular, we compare this equilibrium with that of a Kemp-Wan customs union
made up of the same members. This comparison leads to interesting interpretations
of the Kemp-Wan customs union.
As shown in the previous section, the equilibrium for a conditionally Pareto opti-
mal trading club exhibits a world price vector unchanged from the initial equilibrium,
common domestic price vectors for club members and a common non-discriminatory
tariﬀ vector. The Kemp-Wan customs union also exhibits an unchanged world price
vector and common domestic price vectors but, by contrast, achieves these outcomes
via internal free trade and a common external tariﬀ vector for union members. Nev-
ertheless, the two equilibria are essentially identical as will be shown below.
Before proceeding to state the proposition establishing the equivalence between
these two equilibria, it is helpful to ﬁrst outline the model of a Kemp-Wan customs
union and to contrast it with the model of a trading club dealt with in this paper.
In the case of a customs union, there is a crucial distinction that needs to me made
between internal union trade and external trade.23 24 Deﬁning the vector of trade of
23This speciﬁcation of the model of a customs union draws from Woodland (1982, pp. 352-353).
24There is an important exception to this statement about the need to distinguish between internal
and external trade by union members. This exception occurs in a model where intra-union trade
only involves a subset of goods that are not imported from the rest of the world (as in a model where
each country  exports good  and imports all other goods - the so-called Meade trade pattern).
In this case, non-discriminatory zero tariﬀso nt h i ss u b s e to fg o o d sb yu n i o nm e m b e r si se q u i v a l e n t
to a customs union with discriminatory tariﬀs, since there is no external trade in these goods. See
Melatos and Woodland (2003).Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 24
union member  within the union ( )a s and with the rest of the world as ,
it follows that
 ≡ 
( )= + ∈  (8)
The union’s internal market equilibrium condition is that
X
∈
 =0  (9)
The Kemp-Wan construction keeps the volume of club trade with the rest of the
world ﬁxed at 






similarly to a trading club.
The budget constraint for union member  is given by
| + 
|
0 = !∈  (11)
which is that the sum of the value of internal trades at internal union prices and the
value of external trades at world prices (the balance of trade) must be matched by a
transfer abroad given by !. The transfers are limited to union members and so the
aggregate budget constraint for the union is that
X
∈
! =0  (12)Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 25
This formulation of the model of a Kemp-Wan customs union diﬀers from our
model of the trading club acting in a Kemp-Wan manner in that the customs union
model distinguishes between internal and external trade. Since internal trade is free
in the union, this aﬀects the tariﬀ revenues. Nevertheless, despite this diﬀerence,
our Pareto optimal trading club and the Kemp-Wan customs union equilibria are
essentially identical. This is the content of the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The equilibria arising from a conditional Pareto optimal trading
club and a Kemp-Wan customs union are essentially identical. They have the same
equilibrium values for utilities, prices, consumptions, productions, trades and net
incomes. They diﬀer only in that member countries have potentially diﬀerent tariﬀ
revenues and transfer payments.
Proof. (i) Let the conditionally Pareto optimal trading club equilibrium for do-
mestic prices and club utilities be (  ),w h e r e =(  ∈ ) and
 =(  ∈ ),w h e n(0 
0 ) is the given world price and external trade









( )=∈  (14)
X
∈
 =0  (15)
comprising the club market equilibrium conditions, budget and transfer constraints.
Disaggregate the net export vectors  ≡ 
( ) into internal club and external
trade vectors such that  = + and
P
∈  =0 , assuming that internalNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 26
trades take precedence over external trades, and deﬁne ! = +|∈ ,
where  ≡  −0 is the club’s common tariﬀ vector. It is straightforward to show








0 = !∈  (17)
X
∈
! =0  (18)
These are precisely the equilibrium conditions for a Kemp-Wan customs union con-
sisting of the same members as the trading club (i.e.,  ≡ ). Thus, when the
transfers are adjusted to ! =  + |∈ , the conditional Pareto opti-
mal trading club equilibrium may be interpreted as an equivalent Kemp-Wan customs
union equilibrium for the same countries with the same external (world) price. The
utility levels, net exports and domestic prices are the same; the only diﬀerence is in
the transfers needed to equate incomes in the two regimes.
(ii) By a similar argument, a Kemp-Wan customs union equilibrium (denoted by
superscripts  ) may be re-interpreted as a conditional Pareto optimal trading club
equilibrium, by an adjustment of the transfers to  = ! −|∈  ≡ ,
where  ≡  − 0 =  is the club’s common external tariﬀ vector.
Together (i) and (ii) establish the essential (in all respects except for the values of
the tariﬀ revenues and transfers) equivalence between a conditional Pareto optimal
trading club and a Kemp-Wan customs union.
The following argument is a rather heuristic interpretation of the above proof.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 27
The Kemp-Wan customs union maintains the world price vector at 0 (and, hence,
the external trade vector at 
0 ) by setting a common external tariﬀ vector  and
by imposing internal free trade, while the conditionally Pareto optimal trading club
also maintains the world price vector at 0 (and, hence, the external trade vector
at 
0 = 
0 ) by setting a common non-discriminatory tariﬀ  ≡ .S i n c e , b y
a s s u m p t i o n ,b o t ht h eu n i o na n dt h ec l u bi m p o s et h es a m et a r i ﬀ vector (external
tariﬀ vector for the union and the non-discriminatory tariﬀ vector for the club), they
w i l lh a v et h es a m ed o m e s t i cp r i c ev e c t o r s  Moreover, since the domestic prices are the
same in the two regimes, each member country has the same net exports in the two
regimes and, hence, market equilibrium occurs in both regimes, provided that the
same utility values occur. This requires each country to have the same income under
the two regimes. But will they? The fact that the customs union imposes no tariﬀso n
internal trade while the members of the trading club do via their non-discriminatory
tariﬀ policies suggests that incomes might well be diﬀerent. Certainly, this argument
shows that it will generally (except in very special cases) be the case that tariﬀ
revenues are diﬀerent under the two policy regimes. In the case of a trading club,
internal trade in tennis balls, for example, might involve an import duty on imports
into country A from country B, but the common tariﬀ vector for the club therefore
involves an export subsidy of exactly the same amount in country B. In aggregate,
these trade taxes cancel for the club, but at the country level the government of A
gets revenue while that of B loses revenue. In the case of a customs union, there is no
revenue accruing from internal trade. It would appear, then, that household incomes
would diﬀer in the two regimes - union and club.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 28
However, both the union and the trading club are assumed to have a full set of
income transfers at their disposal. Transfers may be determined to neutralize the
tariﬀ revenue eﬀects and thereby to ensure that household incomes will be the same
in the two regimes, hence ensuring the equivalent of the two equilibria. In the above
example, the tariﬀ revenue received by country A from its imports of tennis balls
from B can be deducted from its overall receipt of income transfers as a trading
club member, while country B can be compensated for its export subsidies on tennis
balls trade with A by having its overall transfer income as a trading club member
increased. If these transfers are undertaken, each trading club member will have
exactly the same income as would accrue to it as a member of a Kemp-Wan customs
union. Accordingly, the trading club equilibrium can be re-interpreted as a Kemp-
Wan customs union equilibrium.
This heuristic argument may also be adapted to show that an equilibrium for a
Kemp-Wan customs union may be re-interpreted as an equilibrium for a condition-
ally Pareto optimal trading club. Again, transfers can be adjusted to ensure that
union members’ incomes can be consistent with the re-interpretation as trading club
members. The arguments, taken together, establish that the two equilibria are essen-
tially identical: they have the same utility, price, consumption, production and trade
vectors but members have diﬀerent tariﬀ revenues and transfers (that yield the same
net incomes) in the two regimes.
Accordingly, it has been shown in Proposition 4 that a conditionally Pareto opti-
mal trading club equilibrium can be interpreted as being an equilibrium for a Kemp-
Wan customs union, the only diﬀerence being in the levels of the tariﬀ revenues andNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 29
required transfers. Apart from being of interest in its own right, this result provides
the basis for an interesting and novel interpretation of the Kemp-Wan customs union.
Propositions 1-4 show, under mild assumptions, that a trading club can yield strict
Pareto improvements in welfare for its members, that a sequence of discrete strict
Pareto improving reforms is possible and that such a sequence ceases once domestic
prices are equal up to a factor of proportionality. That limiting equilibrium is not
only conditionally Pareto optimal for the club, but, by Proposition 4, it is essentially
equivalent to the Kemp-Wan customs union of the same members. Thus, these propo-
sitions provide an alternative path to a Kemp-Wan customs union to that provided
by Kemp and Wan (1976). The Kemp-Wan customs union can be regarded as the
limiting case of a sequence of small discrete strict Pareto improvements undertaken
by a non-discriminatory trading club.
One might argue, of course, that, since a conditionally Pareto optimal trading
club is essentially identical to a Kemp-Wan customs union, a trading club may as
well simply become a Kemp-Wan customs union. While this argument has validity,
there are several advantages to it remaining as a trading club. First, the trading
club may not wish, for political or other reasons, to become a union.25 Second, the
trading club is able to maintain its non-discriminatory trade policy stance and so is
able to be consistent with WTO most-favoured-nation principles. Third, the trading
club might wish to undertake limited rounds of reforms and hence stop well short of
attaining conditional Pareto optimality, although this would be at a welfare cost to
25However, the club members have to arrange internal transfers, just as is the case with a Kemp-
Wan customs union. Accordingly, there is an equivalent a loss of sovereignty for club members in
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its members. For these reasons, our modelling of the trading club seems useful.
5. Conclusions
The literature on preferential trading arrangements is one of the oldest, most exten-
sive and highly controversial in international trade. One of the few contributions that
cut through the complexity of the issues involved was the Kemp-Wan proposition on
the formation of customs unions. The proof of that proposition was merely based
on the application of the second theorem of welfare economics and, as such, it was
ingenious – no particular structure was imposed other than adhering to the perfectly
competitive Arrow-Debreu model.
Here we do a less ingenious thing: we apply tools of diﬀerential tariﬀ reforms
and examine the welfare implications of a trading club moving along a path of non-
discriminatory tariﬀ reform that keeps world prices unchanged. In doing so, we prove
several interesting propositions. First, we prove that our trading club can perform a
coordinated non-discriminatory tariﬀ reform, accompanied with intra-club transfers,
that improves the welfare of each of its members without hurting the rest of the world.
Second, we show that a sequence of such non-discriminatory, Pareto-improving, tariﬀ
reforms exists when ever the domestic prices of club members are diﬀerent. Third,
such a sequence will eventually lead to an equilibrium where member countries face
the same domestic prices, but which are not necessarily characterized by zero internal
tariﬀs. We call this equilibrium a conditionally optimal trading club. Fourth, it is
shown that this conditionally optimal trading club is equivalent (in welfare, prices,
consumption, production and trade, but not in transfers and tariﬀ revenues) to a
Kemp-Wan customs union.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 31
Our results lead to interesting interpretations of the Kemp-Wan customs union.
First, as discussed further above, the Kemp-Wan customs union may be interpreted
as the limiting case of a sequence of small discrete strict Pareto improving reforms
by a trading club that employs a Kemp-Wan-like mechanism for tariﬀ reforms. A
second interpretation is suggested by our proposition on the essential equivalence of
conditionally Pareto optimal trading club and Kemp-Wan customs union equilibria.
Speciﬁcally, the equivalence result highlights something that was not explicitly clear,
viz. that the main element of a Kemp-Wan customs union, apart from the Kemp-Wan
mechanism for common external tariﬀ choice, is the existence of intra-club transfers
and not the choice of free internal trade.
Our results further suggest that there are interesting, welfare-improving trading
arrangements, other than the usual preferential trading arrangements, that deserve
more attention. Indeed, this is the kind of attention that APEC’s open regionalism
concept received in the 1990s. As mentioned in the introduction, APEC constitutes
an example of a regional trading arrangement based on non-discriminatory trade
practices. It is actually the ﬁrst, and only, regional arrangement that promotes the
concept of open regionalism, by which is meant coordinated trade liberalization by
members that is non-discriminatory and therefore consistent with the most favoured
nation principle of GATT. While its unconditional MFN treatment was unambigu-
ous at its inception point in 1989, it was quickly perceived as an unrealistic path
to follow.26 In particular, it was thought to induce free-riding behaviour by the
non-member countries, who will beneﬁt from APEC’s trade liberalization and will
26See Elek (1991) for a detailed account of the emergence of APEC and its guiding principles.Non-Preferential Trading Clubs 32
therefore have reduced incentives to liberalize their trade. The concept of conditional
MFN treatment, i.e. negotiated trade liberalization based on reciprocity, was then
put forward as a more operational deﬁnition of open regionalism (Bergsten, 1997).
Conditional MFN treatment is in principle what the WTO promotes through its
multilateral negotiations and, perhaps because of this, the original concept of open
regionalism through APEC may have lost some of its pioneering spirit. Our model
of a trading club that adopts the mechanism initiated in Kemp and Wan’s model of
customs union formation constitutes a particular unconditional MFN tariﬀ reform -
one that by-passes the free-riding problem referred to above and thus perhaps helps
(theoretically, at least) to return to open regionalism its initial spirit. By designing
the tariﬀ reform in a way that keeps world prices at their pre-club levels, we keep
the welfare of non-members unchanged and therefore remove this possible incentive
for free-riding. Our formulation of open regionalism, i.e. a non-discriminatory tar-
iﬀ reform that keeps world prices ﬁxed, can therefore be seen as justifying a truly
“unconditional MFN” form of open regionalism.
An issue that then arises is whether our particular tariﬀ reform violates other
WTO rules. Throughout the paper we have been very careful in referring to tariﬀ
reform rather than tariﬀ liberalization. By constraining the club members’ tariﬀ
reforms to ensure that world prices are unchanged, the required reforms may require
some tariﬀs to rise and some to fall and, indeed, some trade tax rates may have to be
negative (export subsidies). In this sense, the trading club members’ tariﬀ reforms
may be in conﬂict with the written rules of the WTO. While this may be true, the
tariﬀ reforms undertaken by our trading club are, arguably, not in conﬂict with theNon-Preferential Trading Clubs 33
spirit of the WTO rules, which is that non-participants of a new trading arrangement
should not be harmed. As long as our trading club tariﬀ reforms produces weak Pareto
gains to the world community, it is therefore diﬃcult to criticize it for being against
the spirit of the WTO.27
In terms of economic policy implications, our results may be interpreted as em-
phasizing the value of coordinated tariﬀ reforms, even if these reforms are taken only
by a subset of countries and not the whole world. Open regionalism, in the form of
our non-preferential trading clubs, is Pareto improving for the world.
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